இந்தியப்படைகள் ஏன் வந்தன ?

STAN மீண்டும் ஒரு கருத்தை அனுப்பியிருக்கின்றார். இந்தியப்படைகளின் நோக்கம் இராஜீவ்வின் மனிதாபிமானம் என்ற ரீதியில் அவர் விபரிப்பு இருக்கின்றது. நல்லது; பலவிடயங்களை நாம் பேசுவதன் மூலம் ஒரு தெளிவைப் பெற முடியும் என்பதை நானும் நம்புகின்றேன்.அந்தவகையில் அவர் கேள்விகளையும் அதேநேரம் இந்தியப் படைகள் இலங்கைக்கு வந்தபோது (அது தேவையா என்பது வேறு விடயம்) இலங்கையர்கள் - தமிழர் சிங்களவர் உட்பட- இருந்த மனநிலை பற்றியும் Time magazine cover story (august 10,1987) ஒன்றையும் இணைத்துள்ளேன். விடுதலைப் புலிகளின் செயற்பாடு சரியா பிழையா என்பதை கேள்விக்குட்படுத்துவதற்கு முன்னர் இந்தியப் படைகள் வந்த நோக்கம் சரியா? பிழையா? என்பதையும் ஏன் வந்தார்கள் என்பதையும் விளங்கிக் கொள்ள முயல்வோம்.

இதனைத் தொடர்ந்து இன்னும் பல பகுதிகளைப் பார்க்கலாம்.
// Thanks for posting my comments,
our post explains the reasons for the interest of India towards eelam during Indira Gandhi period, whatever may be, but as a close friend of Rajiv's cabinet I know what were the thoughts of Rajiv on Srilanka and eelam. Rajiv would not have interfered in eelam problem if there would not have been increased number of 25000 refugees to India around 1985-86.Rajiv Gandhi had great proposal for Srilankan Tamils. But everything was spoiled by LTTE and Jeyawardane.Rajiv had a deep interest in Tamil People dying in eelam. That's why the pact was formed. It was very clear route for Tamil people in eelam to get into democratic mode. But LTTE spoiled it. You said LTTE never agreed to the pact. But then why did Prabaharan announced in the public that he believe India and thats why he is giving back the arms.?. After telling this when LTTE realised that they did not have popular vote among Tamils they began to destroy the pact.Now Rajiv became scapegoat in the foil played between Jayawardane and LTTE.IPKF which was acting as a police force, forced to act as Military by LTTE because of its wrong doing, like killing the CM and doing all kinds of atrocities, Having been destroyed by IPKF, LTTE joined with Premadasa starts fighting with IPKF. In this process some criminals in IPKF marred the image of IPKF by raping and killing innocent Tamils. IPKF has taken action against most of its soldiers by bringing them to Miltary court. But you know who became prey and scape goat in all these ?. The innocent Tamil people and Rajiv. Rajiv had alredy lost his life, Tamil people are still loosing thier life. Tell me what is the best pact/agreement LTTE has got for Tamil people in all these 16 year which is better than Rajiv-Jeyawardane agreement. LTTE want to rule Tamils and they dont want any body else to exist so they will kill everybody. But peace forces should keep quiet Is it.?. They will bomb Army and run into hospitals, the army should keep quiet Is it.?. Its LTTE who spoiled the good solution that could have come to Tamil People. Tell me how Rajiv is responsible for some men in army killing tamil guys.You know how the fight started.. The reason for people start hating LTTE is from 1989 to 1991 the worst period in Tamil Nadu where LTTE after spoiling Tamils in eelam they started spoiling Tamils in TamilNadu where you will hear bombs and killings every where including cold blood murder of Padmanaba which ended up in killing our innocent Prime minister Rajiv. Now tell me how tamil people will support LTTE. //

வி.புலிகள் இந்திய-இலங்கை ஒப்பந்தப்படி ஆயுதம் ஒப்படைக்க தொடங்கி விட்ட நேரமது.

IPKF வருகையால் என்ன நடக்கப்போகிறது என தமிழர்கள் ஆவலோடு எதிர்பார்த்த நேரமது..

மேதகு தலைவர் தமிழ் மக்களுக்கு தன்னுடைய எண்ணத்தை பகிர்ந்த ''இந்தியாவை நேசிக்கிறோம்'',என்ற தலைப்பில் சுதுமலையில் பேசிய தருணமது..

திலீபனின் உண்ணாவிரதமும்,புலேந்திரன் குமரப்பா அவர்களின் வீரச்சாவு நடைபெறும் முன் நடந்த சம்பவங்கள் இவை..

Deal in Sri Lanka -The Key Question: How Long Can it Last?

[Edward Desmond; Time magazine cover story, August 10, 1987, pp.6-10]

Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was savoring a diplomatic breakthrough as he emerged from the President’s House in the Sri Lankan capital of Colombo last week. The previous day he had joined Sri Lankan President Junius R.Jayewardene in signing an agreement, long sought by India, that held promise of ending a four-year-old insurgency in which more than 6,000 have been killed.As the Prime Minister strode past the white-uniformed men of a Sri Lankan naval honor guard, one of the sailors suddenly broke ranks and swung at Gandhi with the butt of his rifle. The Prime Minister ducked and received only a glancing blow on the back of his neck and left shoulder. But if he escaped serious injury in the incident, for which the Sri Lankan government quickly apologized, the Prime Minister must have realized how much strife and distrust had been aroused by the pact he had just initiated – and how uncertain were its chances of success.The agreement was worked out during three weeks of secret talks between New Delhi and Colombo.

Its centerpiece was Jayewardene’s concession of local rule in two regions heavily populated by Sri Lanka’s Tamils, an ethnic minority comprising 12.5% of the country’s 16 million people. In exchange, Gandhi, whose government has provided refuge and vital support to Tamil insurgents fighting the Colombo government, promised to ensure that the rebels would lay down their arms.Gandhi’s pledge was backed up the morning after the signing ceremony, when 3,000 Indian troops landed by air and sea on the Tamil-dominated Jaffna Peninsula in the north of the island. Their task: disarm the guerrillas and take up peacekeeping duties.The Indian military’s job will not be easy; indeed, a direct confrontation between the guerrillas and their former protectors may be inevitable. The Indian army’s first contact with representatives of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the largest and most militant of the five rebel groups, ended in a standoff.

A group of 400 angy Tamils rocked the vehicle of the Indian commander, Major General Harkirat Singh, while yelling that the Tigers would not lay down their arms. A senior Tiger commander told TIME, ‘The Indians will have to cross our dead bodies to get these weapons.’ The Tiger’s main complaint was that their leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, had been confined to a New Delhi hotel room because of his resistance to the pact, which he called a ‘stab in the back’. But early this week, Prabakaran was permitted to return to Jaffna after pledging that he would ask his commanders to lay down their arms.As his aircraft descended toward Colombo at midweek, Gandhi could see that Jayewardene had serious problems of his own. Columns of black smoke rose over the capital as angry mobs, overwhelmingly from the Sinhalese majority, battled police and burned buses to protest the settlement. At least 70 people were killed last week as police and soldiers resorted to rifle fire to contain the rioting. In the protester’s eyes, Jayewardene, once their hero, had caved in to rebel demands and Indian pressure.

‘Let’s be truthful,’ said one government official. ‘Ninety percent of the Sinhalese people are against us.’For all the controversy it has aroused, the accord offers benefits to both countries – if it holds up. For Sri Lanka, it could mean a return to peace after years of bloodshed and political turmoil; for India, success would promote its coveted image as the regional superpower.

Said US State Department Spokesman Charles Redman: ‘We applaud the statesmanlike efforts and perseverance of these courageous leaders in achieving this accord.’The potential gains are especially attractive to Gandhi, who is facing growing opposition at home. If the accord does not crumble, the Prime Minister will have not only enhanced India’s image as a peace-maker but also extracted concessions from Colombo that amount to a compromising of Sri Lankan independence in the areas of defense and foreign affairs. The Indian initiative carries risks as well: should the Tamil Tigers resist and drag the Indian peacekeeping forces into the insurgency, the enterprise could turn into a political calamity for Gandhi.Jayewardene is taking an even bigger chance. His Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, refused to attend the pact’s signing and is actively speaking out against it. The military, 45,000-strong, backs the President, but foreign diplomats in Colombo believe the accord is seriously straining the loyalty of the lower ranks.

The main opposition party and Buddhist monks, who form an influential force in Sinhalese society, were in the vanguard of the antigovernment demonstrations. Said Madihe Pannaseeha, chief priest of the Amarapura Chapter of Buddhists: ‘India’s aim is the total subjugation of Sri Lanka. First of all, they will take the north and east. Then they will infiltrate the central provinces. Ultimately they will have the whole country.’Sinhalese distrust of India runs deep. Over two milleniums, Sri Lanka’s Buddhist majority has fought back periodic invasions from Hindu India. Sri Lanka’s Tamils are Hindus too, and the Sinhalese tend to regard them as India’s natural allies. The current round of Tamil-Sinhalese conflict goes back to 1956, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, now the leading opposition group, assumed power in Colombo.

In a burst of Sinhalese chauvinism, the party made Sinhala the sole official language and restricted job and educational opportunities for ethnic minorities, effectively reducing the Tamils to second-class citizens.Though Jayewardene’s United National Party eased the discrimination in 1977, bitter feelings remained. Tamil resentment erupted into sporadic violence. In July 1983 one of those incidents catapulted the country into war: after Tamil guerrillas ambushed and killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, enraged Sinhalese stampeded through Colombo and killed at least 600 Tamils. With that, a full-fledged Tamil insurgency was born.The rebels’ goal was a unified, independent state for Tamils in the island’s Northern and Eastern provinces, though it was widely assumed that most would settle for an autonomous homeland. The 3,500-man Tigers, under the charismatic leadership of Prabakaran, emerged as the most powerful insurgent group, dominating the Jaffna Peninsula. The Tigers’ nationalist line proved more appealing to Tamils than the doctrinaire Marxism of other organizations; they also showed no reluctance to gun down competitors.Outnumbered by the Sri Lankan military and poorly armed, the insurgents would not have gone far without assistance from India. Just 22 miles across the Palk Strait from northern Sri Lanka lies India’s Tamil Nadu state, home of 55 million Indian Tamils.

On an initially covert but increasingly visible basis, New Delhi and the Tamil Nadu state government provided the rebel groups with weapons, training camps and staging areas. Even as it armed the guerrillas, India pressed the Jayewardene government to negotiate a settlement with the Tigers. New Delhi, however, did not endorse the Tigers’ demand for independence, insisting instead that Colombo grant local rule.Jayewardene refused. The Tigers dug in on the Jaffna Peninsula, from where they staged frequent raids and terrorist attacks into the south. During a single week in April, a car bomb in Colombo and a massacre in the Eastern Province claimed the lives of at least 240 civilians, nearly all of them Sinhalese. A month later the Sri Lankan military launched an all-out offensive against the Tigers in the Jaffna area. India demanded that Colombo call off the action, then defied Sri Lankan sovereignty by sending air force cargo planes to parachute 22.5 tons of nonmilitary supplies into the Tamil areas.At that point, according to Indian diplomats, Jayewardene saw the writing on the wall: he realized that India, with its superior military might, was determined to stop Colombo’s efforts to defeat the Tamil rebels.

Said a Western diplomat in Sri Lanka: ‘The military option was no longer viable. Direct talks with the militants, considering their adamancy, were not viable.’ Jayewardene’s only way out was to negotiate with New Delhi.In June and July, secret talks began through diplomatic intermediaries. Says Neelan Tiruchelvam, a leading Tamil moderate: ‘The Indian and Sri Lankan governments felt the only way it would work was to present Tamil and Sinhalese extremists with a fait accompli.’ Colombo agreed to New Delhi’s proposal for Tamil local rule, while India acceded to Jayewardene’s request that it impose the settlement on the rebels – by force if need be. (Indian troops had helped Colombo once before, when they intervened briefly to put down an insurrection in 1971.) Asked at a news conference last week why he had not come up with such a proposal four years ago, Jayewardene, 80, and noted for his idiosyncratic remarks, drew gasps when replied, ‘Lack of courage on my part, lack of intelligence on my part, lack of foresight on my part.’The terms of last week’s agreement: Within 48 hours of the signing, a ceasefire to take effect throughout the country. Within 72 hours, rebel units to lay down their arms and Sri Lankan soldiers to return to barracks. Colombo to decree a general amnesty for all Tamil rebels and to free all Tamil political prisoners. Colombo to declare that English and Tamil, in addition to Sinhala, be official languages. New Delhi to expel any Tamil advocating separatism or terrorism in Sri Lanka and to close down rebel camps in Tamil Nadu. Indian and Sri Lankan naval vessels to patrol the Palk Strait to interdict any supply shipments for the rebels. Colombo to create a unified, locally ruled province out of the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. By the end of the year, residents of the new region would elect a governor, chief minister and a cabinet. Some 92% of the northern area’s residents are Tamils; the comparative figure stands at just 40% in the eastern region. As a result, the agreement provides that easterners would decide by referendum next year whether to remain unified with the north. Most observers believe the easterners would opt out. The provision is unacceptable to the Tigers.India took advantage of its strong position to pull Sri Lanka more closely into its orbit. Jayewardene’s pro-Western attitudes and laissez-faire economic policies have long irritated New Delhi, which describes itself as a nonaligned, socialist-leaning country and sees itself as the dominant force in South Asia. As part of the accord, Jayewardene agreed to deny military use of the naval base at Trincomalee and other Sri Lankan ports ‘in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests’ and promised that foreign broadcasting facilities in Sri Lanka would have no ‘military or intelligence purposes’. The latter concession was prompted by Indian concerns about a Voice of America transmitter under construction near the west coast town of Puttalam, north of Colombo.Moreover, Colombo said it would consult with India before bringing in ‘foreign military or intelligence personnel.’ Since 1984, Sri Lanka has relied on Israeli, Pakistani and other foreign experts to help combat the insurgency. Asked at a press conference whether Sri Lanka had moved closer to India, Jayewardene hesitated, then said softly, ‘We are free, and we will remain friends of India’.Winning concessions from Jayewardene was only part of Gandhi’s task. If the peace plan was to succeed, he needed cooperation from Sri Lanka’s Tamils and their supporters in India. Foremost among the backers were M.G. Ramachandran, Tamil Nadu’s influential chief minister, and his pro-Tamil party, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. Without Ramachandran’s acquiescence, it would be difficult to clamp down on rebel activities in the state. To Gandhi’s relief, Ramachandran consented, perhaps because the Tamil rebel groups have become something of a threat to law-and-order in Tamil Nadu.The second, and much more difficulot, job of persuasion centered on the Tigers. Gandhi’s representatives approached Tiger Chief Prabakaran. With Colombo’s permission, an Indian air force helicopter flew to Jaffna a week ago to pick up the Tamil chieftain, who had not been informed of the peace proposal. The first stop was Madras, the Tamil Nadu capital, where Chief Minister Ramachandran tried but failed to cajole Prabakaran into going along. Next, Prabakaran was flown to New Delhi for three days of discussions. The Tiger leader continued to resist, arguing that his fighters would not be safe without their weapons once Indian forces departed. He insisted that the future of the Eastern Province could not be separated from that of the Northern.As the talks grew heated, Prabakaran described the deal as an ‘act of betrayal’ and charged that he had been ‘tricked’ into coming to New Delhi. ‘Let them take away our arms,’ he declared. ‘But the peacekeeping force proposed to be deployed will have to protect Tamil lives and property. When we are disarmed at the instance of India, India will be held responsible for atrocities against Tamils.’ Even a meeting with Gandhi failed to soothe the Tiger Chieftain. Placed under military guard, he sat out the pact signing in a room at the government-owned Ashok Hotel in New Delhi. Indian officials hinted that Prabakaran would face exile if he did not have a change of heart.Countering those pressures with an ultimatum of their own, the Tiger leadership and several smaller rebel groups announced that they would not lay down their arms until Prabakaran returned to Jaffna. ‘Our friendship with India,’ said the Tiger statement, ‘depends on the Indian government’s understanding of our basic issues.’Early this week, Prabakaran appeared to give in. After promising that he would ask his fighters to put down their arms, New Delhi arranged for him to fly on an Indian air force plane to Jaffna, where he arrived Sunday afternoon. It appeared that a concession from Colombo was what brought about a change in Prabakaran’s attitude. Sri Lankan officials told Prabakaran that he could have a leading role in an interim body administering the Eastern and Northern provinces until elections. He was also reportedly guaranteed the right to appoint a personal security force. Despite the apparent end to the impasse, observers in Colombo and New Delhi were unsure what would actually happen after Prabakaran met with his men.Jayewardene may have trouble keeping his part of the bargain. The day before he and Gandhi signed the pact, opposition leaders and Buddhist monks sparked violent antigovernment demonstrations. In front of Colombo’s central rail station, Madoluwe Sobitha, a well-known monk, told a crowd that Jayewardene was no different from Sri Lankan leaders who had ‘sold out’ the country first to the Portuguese, later to the British. ‘There are only 24 ohours left for us to do something about this,’ he declared. Before long, protesters were hurling stones at police, and several buses were torched. Outnumbered police killed several demonstrators. Protests spread around the country; Red Cliffs, Jayewardene’s vacation home on the southern end of the island, was set on fire.The next morning, two hours before Gandhi was due to arrive, the government declared a curfew across the island and deployed soldiers to keep demonstrators from approaching the presidential residence. In addition to holding back the angry crowds, senior police and military officers had their hands full trying to keep their own unhappy forces in line. Said one enlisted man: (I have been wearing this uniform nonstop for four days. But what use is it? I am unable to support my own people. This gun I have should be pointed in the other direction.’ Still, the security forces held, and Gandhi’s car drove through empty streets to the President’s House, where he was welcomed by Jayewardene and Kandyan drummers in brilliant white-and-red uniforms.Even in his own camp, Jayewardene faced trouble. While the pact was being initialed, Prime Minister Premadasa, who had boycotted the ceremony, was busy giving alms of yellow rice, curd, fruit and cake to Buddhist monks. He claimed he had not been involved in negotiating the deal with India. ‘I asked them not to sign this, even yesterday,’ he told the monks. ‘There is terrorism in Sri Lanka only because India is backing it.’Since many in Jayewardene’s ruling United National Party feel no different, the agreement stands a slim chance of winning ratification in Parliament. Mere identification with the document appeared to be dangerous; late in the week a UNP deputy who had attended the signing ceremony was assassinated by a group of Sinhalese men; in response, Jayewardene granted UNP deputies permission to carry weapons. Jayewardene has vowed to dissolve Parliament and call new elections if there is no ratification. That threat may keep his party in line: given the widespread Sinhalese anger at Jayewardene, elections would probably be a disaster for UNP deputies.At the same time, Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, head of the centrist Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Prime Minister from 1960 to 1965 and from 1970 to 1977, supported last week’s demonstrations: ‘From now on we will have to consult India on everything,’ she declared. Government censorship kept opposition statements out of the papers.Jayewardene’s best chance to rebuild his political position would be the success of the pact itself. Said Defense and National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali: ‘The key thing is the disarming of the separatists. A week from now, I want to be able to say India has done a, b, c and d. Then I can go to the people and make a plea for no more violence.’As Indian forces arrived in the Jaffna area, comments by Jyotindra Nath Dixit, the Indian high commissioner in Colombo, heightened Sinhalese fears that India might be aiming at more than a temporary stay. When the troop deployment was announced, Defense Minister Athulathmudali explained that the units would be under Sri Lankan command. Sounding a bit like a proconsul, Dixit at first told a Colombo news conference that the Indian troops would answer to him; he later allowed, however, that Jayewardene was in ultimate control of the peacekeeping force. Asked how long they would remain, Dixit answered, ‘Whenever our troops have moved into a foreign territory since independence, they have left when the job was done.’ Countered Athulathmudali: ‘Indians have a timeless culture.’Even if the Indians plan to stay only long enough to disarm the Tigers, that may take longer than New Delhi or Colombo ever anticipated. The Indian commander in Sri Lanka, Major General Singh, met late last week with Kumarappa (a nom de guerre), the Tiger commander in Jaffna. Singh eventually persuaded Kumarappa to allow him to talk with local people. A few miles away, in the village of Tellipallai, the mob of 400 Tamils closed in on the general’s car and began rocking it back and forth. The protesters chanted slogans declaring they wanted an independent Eelam and would never surrender their arms. ‘These people are diehards,’ Singh said later. ‘But I think we can deal with them.’After three days in Sri Lanka, the Indian peacekeeping brigade had yet to collect a single rifle from the Tamil Tigers. At the air base in Palali, on the Jaffna Peninsula, Indian planes and helicopters were arriving around the clock with crates of ammunition, mortars and heavy equipment. To all appearances, the Indian force had come to stay for a while. [Reported by Qadri Ismail and Ross H.Munro/Colombo and K.K.Sharma/New Delhi]Lok Sabha PandemoniumWhile Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi savored success in Colombo, his political troubles at home bubbled on. Stirred up by charges of corruption in the government, Congress (I) Party and opposition members last week brought Parliament’s ‘monsoon session’ to a virtual standstill.The ruckus began in the Lok Sabha, the lower house, after an opposition Janata Party member proposed a motion that would have opened a floor debate on the corruption issue. The intent was to thwart a Congress (I) plan to form a parliamentary committee, dominated by its members, to look into the charges. The inquiry centers on kickbacks paid by Bofors, a Swedish armsmaker, to Indian officials in connection with a $1.3 billion deal, a contract signed in 1986 while Gandhi also held the Defense portfolio. Since the scandal broke last April, Gandhi’s image has been hurt by claims that he shielded friends who illegally transferred wealth to Switzerland and by his expulsion of four critics from Congress (I). The opposition’s move to get the corruption issue on the floor failed, but caused so much disarray that the Lok Sabha had to be adjourned twice on its first day in session. When Defense Minister K.C.Pant began to read a Congress (I) proposal for a parliamentary investigation, angry opposition members squatted in front of the Speaker’s chair in an attempted sit-in. Congress (I) deputies rushed forward, shouting and shaking their fists. In the crush, Ajoy Biswas, a member of the Communist Party of India – Marxist, snatched Pant’s notes.The next day Minister of Parliamentary Affairs H.K.L. Bhagat demanded that Biswas be suspended. The move was resisted by the opposition and even tacitly by Speaker Balram Jakhar, who read Biswas’ apology. Given Congress (I)’s four-fifths majority, however, the motion passed. The Speaker then asked Pant to put his motion on the agenda, thus formally bringing it before the Lok Sabha.Despite Parliament’s gestures of support, disillusionment with Gandhi is growing in his party. At a Congress (I) meeting last week, a resolution proclaiming ‘full faith’ in his leadership led to such heated debate that it was not put to a vote. Former Defense Minister V.P. Singh was a visible critic. En route to Uttar Pradesh, he was stopped 22 times by supporters shouting anti-Gandhi slogans.The Biswas suspension was reversed at Gandhi’s insistence, but not before the opposition had boycotted the Lok Sabha for a day. Surprisingly, the government did not push through the Bofors inquiry in their absence. That effort will come this week – and with it, most likely, trouble for Gandhi.